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The question of the meaning of life was little discussed by analytic philoso-
phers during most of the twentieth century; indeed, many dismissed it as 
devoid of content. These books reflect a welcome resurgence of interest in the 
question that has emerged in the last several years. Addressing this question 
has the potential to reshape and improve our understanding of such things 
as the nature of the good life, the relative importance of moral, epistemic, 
aesthetic, and other values, and the nature of wisdom (amongst other things). 
It is also an issue that the public expects philosophers to address, and we 
would do well to reclaim it from self-help gurus and other charlatans. 
Cottingham's volume is part of Routledge's recent 'Thinking in Action' 
series, a series that (according to the editors) 'takes philosophy to its public. 
Each book in the series is written by a major international philosopher or 
thinker, engages with an important contemporary topic, and is clearly and 
accessibly written.' Cottingham's book largely succeeds on all of these counts. 
The book is divided into three chapters. The first is primarily devoted to 
addressing whether the question is itself meaningful (Cottingham believes 
so), and whether a range of secular answers to the question - that often 
involve treating a meaningful life as simply one in which a person is involved 
in projects that she herself values - are adequate (he believes not). Cotting-
ham suggests that a meaningful life ,vill necessarily involve flourishi ng as a 
human being, a social creature with a range of abilities, needs, potentials, 
and so forth. Meaning is created as we engage in social practices that 
contribute to such flourishing, both for ourselves, and for others. 
The second chapter focuses on finding a space for theistic belief in a 
contemporary, post-Darwinian worldview. Cottingham argues plausibly that 
the theist need not reject evolution, the Big Bang, and so on; nothing prevents 
God from making use of such mechanisms in His creation. I suspect Cotting-
ham's arguments here will seem somewhat obvious to philosophers, but will 
be valuable to many lay readers who might be too quick to assume that 
theism and a fu]] embrace of the sciences are necessarily incompatible. 
Finally, the third chapter (the longest of the three) provides further 
exposition and development of Cottingham's position. Cottingham argues 
that theism provides us with a hope of success and a resiliency in our projects 
22 
that is absent in secular approaches to a meaningful life. Further, by 
engaging in the practices of a spiritual tradition our character is shaped in 
beneficial ways, and our life as a whole becomes more meaningful as we take 
part in a way of life that is focused on love, and the good. And, following 
Pascal, he argues that by engaging in such spiritual practices we will 
(typically) come to a rich faith. (Cottingham takes the question of the 
existence of a God to be beyond our rational capacities, but argues that this 
allows us room for the commitment and faith he proposes.) 
Cottingham's writing is engaging and accessible, and he manages to cover 
a good bit of ground in a short volume. There are occasions where arguments 
could use further development and where the assessment of various views 
seems to end too soon; but this is to be expected in a short introductory volume 
intended for a general audience. And indeed, if one were using the book in 
an introductory course, there would be plenty of scope for using it as a 
springboard for more in-depth discussions in class. 
Relatedly, Cottingham draws upon passages from an impressive array of 
philosophers, poets, and other writers. In some cases the background to the 
views presented is rather incomplete, and would need to be supplemented. 
For example, Cottingham mentions the views of Spinoza and Leibniz, but I 
worry that his explanations would not be adequate for many undergraduates 
or non-philosophers. Again, this would be an area where an instructor could 
supplement the volume with further in-class lecturing or discussion of these 
views. 
On the Meaning of Life would serve well as a textbook for units of 
lower-level philosophy courses on this issue; general readers would also profit 
from it. It is concise and clear, and would provide an excellent starting point 
for discussions with students. As a short introductory text there is less for 
professional philosophers; still, there are several aspects that should be of 
interest to such. In particular, Cottingham's positive proposal will appeal to 
many, and provides an interesting case of a broadly theistic or spiritual 
account of the meaning of life that downplays the importance of an eternal 
life and rewards, and instead focuses on the importance of engaging in 
valuable practices in our daily lives. 
Hein egg's anthology consists of brief selectfons (often a page or less) from 
over fifty authors, selections that in Heinegg's view argue for or express 
'mortalism', the position that there is no human afterlife. The selections are 
organized chronologically, and draw upon a wide range of authors, including 
Marcus Aurelius, Shakespeare, Dickinson, Freud, Tolstoy, and Joyce. 
Unfortunately, this anthology will be oflimited interest to most philoso-
phers. Many of the selections do not obviously argue for or express 'mortal-
ism'; Heinegg seems to include many pieces that simply express fear at the 
thought of death, and often takes an author's mere failure to mention an 
afterlife as adequate reason to include a passage as an instance ofmortalism. 
Beyond this, there is very, very little argument included in the selections. 
Rather, there are several poetic expressions of a fear of death, or a stubborn 
resistance against it; while these passages are often quite moving, one will 
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be hard pressed to find extended, philosophically articulate discussions in 
this volume. 
The scope of the anthology is also rather narrow: all of the selections 
support or express mortalism; no other positions are included. It thus would 
not function well as a general anthology for classes dealing with the meaning 
of life. I should perhaps add that the subtitle, 'Readings on the Meaning of 
Life', is rather misleading; there is little or no explicit discussion of such. 
Again, the volume contains many poetic or fictional passages that express or 
reflect the belief that there is no afterlife; even in those cases where Heinegg 
includes passages from philosophers, he typically fails to include their 
arguments, and instead merely provides summary statements of their views. 
Only in rare instances is there any discussion of the implications ofmortalism 
for the meaning oflife, or of the different accounts of the meaning oflife open 
to and endorsed by mortalists. Heinegg's anthology might be of interest to 
those looking for brief passages from poets and other writers on death; but 
beyond this there is little discussion of the meaning of life, little argument, 
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Habermas' concern in this essay is to respond to 'debates touched off by 
genetic technology' (vii). Facing ferocious debates regarding biotechnology, 
the philosophical question of norms and morals seems to become irrelevant 
because it loses its own way amid the overspecialisation. Habermas is 
criticising not only 'deontological theories after Kant' (4) that cannot respond 
to the question of the necessity of being moral, but also the 'political theories' 
which are becoming incapable of resolving citizen's conflicts 'about the 
principles of their living together', as well as 'theories of justice that have 
been uncoupled from ethics'. Habermas' aim is vast, and his concern is to 
restore a philosophical possibility that will make possible 'a substantive 
position' (11). The need for such a position is essential, because what is really 
at stake is 'the ethical self-understanding of language-using agents'. But, 
Habermas notices also that 'today the original philosophical question con-
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